Epistemology Supernaturalized by Mann, William E.
Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian 
Philosophers 
Volume 2 Issue 4 Article 8 
10-1-1985 
Epistemology Supernaturalized 
William E. Mann 
Follow this and additional works at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy 
Recommended Citation 
Mann, William E. (1985) "Epistemology Supernaturalized," Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of 
Christian Philosophers: Vol. 2 : Iss. 4 , Article 8. 
Available at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy/vol2/iss4/8 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative 
exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian 
Philosophers by an authorized editor of ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange. 
EPISTEMOLOGY SUPERNATURALIZED 
William E. Mann 
If God is omniscient then he knows contingent facts. If he exists a se, then his know ledge 
of facts must not depend on them. How then does he know them? I take seriously Aquinas' 
view that God's knowledge is the cause of things. I argue that "things" includes both 
entities and situations, that God's knowledge of them is his knowledge of his unimpedable 
will, and that the view does not threaten human freedom. God's knowledge is thus like 
my knowledge of my linguistic stipulations, except that whereas my knowledge is de 
dicta, his is de reo 
"How, it might be asked, could one stipulate that s~mething be contin-
gently true? ... Surely only God, if even He, could perform the miracle 
of stipulating how the world shall be." 
Keith Donnellan 
We all know that God knows all there is to know. How does he do it? Perhaps 
God alone knows how he knows. Why should we care? 
Some epistemologists have insisted that the question whether a person can be 
rightly said to know something cannot be isolated from the question how the 
purported item of knowledge was produced in that person. If they are correct~ 
then to say that God knows everything without explaining how he can know 
anything is whistling in the dark. The problem is compounded by the fact that 
traditional theists have insisted that God does not know things in the way(s) in 
which we know things, thus preventing the straightforward application of human 
cognitive psychology to God. It is possible, of course, for theists both to deny 
the claim made by naturalistic epistemologists and to insist that our knowledge 
of God's knowledge must walk the confines of a via negativa. Their case, 
however, would gain plausibility if it could be shown that strolls down viae 
positivae always result in intellectual muggings. It is the aim of this paper to 
explore one positive account of how God knows which is free from philosophical 
fear. 
In the first section of this paper I shall explore the reasons why theists have 
insisted that God's knowledge is different from ours. In Section II and III I shall 
develop and examine an account of God's knowledge whose major ingredients 
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are to be found in Question 14 of the First Part of St. Thomas Aquinas' Summa 
theologiae. Although I have provided translations in the Appendix to this paper 
of three of the more important passages from Question 14, I shall not be engaged 
in close textual analysis, and it would not distress me to find out that my account 
does not square entirely with Aquinas.' In all sorts of ways my exposition will 
be clearly anachronistic. I am more interested in defensibility of thesis than 
fidelity to Thomas. FinalIy, the account will be partial at best. It will deal only 
with God's knowledge of contingent fact. I shall not consider the problems of 
whether and how God knows necessary truths I or counterfactual conditionals. 2 
As for future contingent facts-in particular, facts concerning the future free 
choices of persons-it will be a corollary of the account that from God's point 
of view, none of them are future, although many of them are free. 
I. How God Does Not Know 
Jones ate a bacon, lettuce, and tomato sandwich for lunch last Thursday. Now 
how could you, a normal human being with standard human cognitive devices 
and capacities, come to know this fact? There seem to be three possible ways. 
(1) You accept the testimony of a reliable agent (Jones' friend Smith, who had 
lunch with him last Thursday) or device (an FBI camera, set in place as part of 
PORKSCAM). (2) You infer the fact from your prior knowledge of other facts 
and generalities, such as Jones' tastes, the restaurant he went to, and so forth. 
(3) You were there: you witnessed him eating the BLT. 
I believe that (l), (2), and (3) exhaust the possibilities. Of course different 
epistemologists will clamor to tell us that some one of these ways reduces to 
one of the others-(1) to (2), perhaps, or (3) to (2}-but our present concern is 
not that these categories by exclusive, but rather exhaustive. Moreover, these 
ways are ordinary ways of acquiring knowledge of contingent fact. 1 am ruling 
out extraordinary ways, such as your knowledge of Jones' BLT consumption 
being innate by a feat of precognition. If you know about Jones' BLT in one of 
those ways, then you are equipped with some non-standard cognitive capacities. 
(I shall return to these issues later.) 
There are well-known traditional theological grounds for denying that God 
knows about Jones' BLT in any of ways 0), (2), or (3). Concerning method 
0), if God's knowledge were acquired by accepting testimony, then he would 
be dependent upon the agent or device in question for part of his knowledge. 
However, God is supposed to be a perfectly independent being, existing a se, 
upon whom all other things depend. 3 Offered the choice of either giving up the 
thesis of divine aseity or the application of method (1) to God, theists will 
abandon the latter. 
Laplace's Demon, a being who deductively infers all subsequent states of a 
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detenninistic universe from his knowledge of its laws of nature and some of its 
earlier states, is a splashy example of a being who obtains knowledge by method 
(2). Ordinary mortals, who make all sorts of garden-variety inductive inferences 
on the basis of more or less adequate evidence, provide a less dramatic example. 
We might be inclined to think that inductive inferences are somehow beneath 
God's dignity; more to the point, that since inductive inferences involve a loss 
in transfer of certainty, a truly omniscient being cannot be required to depend 
on them. But what is there to prevent God from acquiring some knowledge of 
contingent fact deductively? We do not have to assume that the universe is totally 
detenninistic to allow for this possibility. Nor is it obvious that the objection 
used against ascribing method (1) to God applies here. If God is able to deduce 
that Jones ate a BLT last Thursday from other facts and laws, then one might 
argue that this new piece of knowledge does not depend on the other facts and 
laws, but rather on God's knowledge of them. 
Nevertheless, traditional theists rejected the idea that God knew anything by 
deduction. Aquinas, for example, regards deductive inference as a kind of "dis-
cursive" knowledge, which cannot apply to God.' There is a difference between 
the notion of logical consequence and the activity of drawing a consequence: 
although it is tempting to say that the fonner is not a temporal phenomenon, the 
latter is. It is clear that God cannot acquire knowledge by drawing consequences, 
whether he is temporal or timeless. For if he is timeless he cannot participate 
in a temporal process. And if he is a temporal being, then if he is genuinely 
acquiring knowledge of Q by deducing Q from P and P -> Q, then there was a 
time at which he did not know that Q. And if that is so, then there was a time 
at which God was not omniscient. Hence if God is essentially omniscient, he 
cannot acquire knowledge of anything by deduction. 
Aquinas' doctrine goes further than this, however, Not only is the drawing 
of consequences precluded from God's knowledge, but so also is there being 
logical consequences in God's knowledge. God is supposed to know all things 
with equal immediacy; his knowledge of Q, then, must be direct and not mediated 
by or conditional upon his knowledge of P -> Q and P. Qua omniscient, he 
knows that P -> Q, that P, that Q, and that Q is a consequence of P -> Q and 
P: nevertheless, his knowledge of Q cannot depend on other items of his knowl-
edge. We can view Aquinas' doctrine as an extension of the doctrine of God's 
aseity. In addition to requiring that God be independent of all other things, the 
doctrine requires that no part or aspect of God be dependent on any other part 
or aspect. One may wonder whether this extension of the doctrine of God's 
aseity is a coherent demand. I believe that it is, but I shall defer discussion of 
its coherence until Section III. 
Perhaps, then, God knows about Jones' BLT by means of method (3)? He 
was there--after all, he is supposed to be everywhere-so he must have seen 
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Jones consume the BLT. Waiving any difficulties we may have with the doctrine 
of God's omnipresence, we may still wonder how his "being there" helps us to 
understand how he knows about Jones' gustatory feat. Theists will hasten to 
insist that God did not literally see Jones eat the BL T. God has no body and 
hence no organs of sense; he is a purely spiritual being. To say that God sees 
Jones eat the BL T is to speak metaphorically,S akin to saying that Smith sees 
the point of Jones' strange behavior. We should say rather that God understands, 
by some sort of direct, immediate mental intuition, that Jones ate the BLT. This 
maneuver, however, does nothing to answer the question how God knows; it 
merely postpones it. Instead of 'How does God know?' we now have 'How does 
God understand?' 
The force of the question can be brought out in the following way. It is very 
tempting to think that all three ways of standard human knowledge-acquisition-
(1), (2), and (3)-involve some sort of causal connection between fact and 
knower. In reverse order: (3) If you witnessed Jones eating the BLT, then you 
were obviously causally en rapport with (some of) the sequence of events which 
constituted Jones' eating a BLT. (That you are now genuinely remembering 
having witnessed Jones eating a BLT must also be accounted for in causal terms.) 
(2) Your inference that Jones ate a BLT, if it is justified at all, must depend on 
premises which refer to causal antecedents of Jones' eating the BLT or, in the 
case of retrodictive inference, causal consequences of Jones' eating the BLT. 
(1) Rational agent that you are, you would not base your belief about Jones on 
the testimony of an agent or mechanism which you had no reason to believe 
was causally connected to Jones in any way. 
There is a strong tendency to think, then, that human knowledge of contingent 
fact requires that there be some causal connection between fact and knower. 
Consider the alternative: try seriously to conceive of Smith's genuinely knowing 
that Jones ate a BLT last Thursday, yet with Smith's knowledge being causally 
insulated from Jones' eating the BLT; that is, there being no causal chain, of 
however many links, connecting the fact to Smith's knowledge of it. I suggest 
that the longer you try, the less intelligible the project will seem to you. One 
does not need to be prepared to defend a causal theory of knowledge in order 
to accept this point. One need not, for example, claim that causation must be 
built into the very analysis of knowledge, nor need one know how to sort out 
the causal chains which transmit knowledge from the twisted chains (typically 
forged by philosophers) which do not. 6 Nor need one worry, for our purposes, 
about squaring mathematical knowledge with a causal theory. 
As indirect support for the thesis that human knowledge of contingent fact 
must somehow be causally related to the fact, consider our attitude toward the 
possibility of one's knowing a contingent fact in one of the extraordinary ways 
mentioned earlier. No nativist of my ken would want to claim that our specimen 
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fact about Jones's BLT is a piece of innate knowledge. Suppose, however, that 
some more dignified, more interesting, more basic contingent facts are known 
innately. Surely we would seek an explanation as to why that knowledge is 
"wired in." Perhaps God in his wisdom saw fit to make it so. Or perhaps the 
knowledge in question has such a survival value that ancestors in our species 
(or in species antecedent to our species) who did not possess it died off. In any 
case the explanation will be satisfactory only if it specifies a causal medium-in 
our examples, God, or natural selection-which links fact to knowledge. 
For people who have taken the possibility of precognition seriously, the differ-
ence between one's merely having a premonition of a future event and one's 
having precognitive knowledge of it lies precisely in there being the right kind 
of causal connection between future event and present awareness of it. Thus the 
case for (and perhaps also against) the possibility of precognition hinges on the 
possibility of retrograde causation: rather than give up the claim to knowledge 
by precognition, precognitivists would jettison the thesis that a cause must tem-
porally precede its effect. 7 
It would be interesting to investigate the thesis further, 8 but I shall not do so 
here. It is enough for our purposes that we see how the thesis is initially plausible 
and tempting. 9 For to the extent to which we find it plausible, it underscores the 
difference between our knowledge and God's, according to a traditional theolog-
ical doctrine. The great medieval theologians, for example, held the opinion that 
God's knowledge is uncaused by anything distinct from God. In particular, the 
contingent events and facts of the world do not cause God to have knowledge 
of them)O The doctrine is a corollary of the doctrine of God's aseity. If God's 
knowledge of contingent states of affairs were caused by the states of affairs 
themselves, then God would be dependent on them for his knowing what he 
knows. Therefore he cannot know about contingent states of affairs by being on 
the receiving end of a causal chain, no matter how few links it might possess. 
So now it appears that the avenue to knowledge upon which humans must 
travel is closed to God. How, then, does he get there? 
II. "God's Knowledge Is The Cause Of Things" 
A. What Things? "God's knowledge is the cause of things," says Aquinas in ST, 
la, q. 14, a. 8. The gambit is hardly surprising in light of the previous discussion: 
God's knowledge cannot be the effect of things, so reverse the causality and 
make his knowledge the cause of things. As articulated so far, the gambit can 
easily be declined. First, it is simply no answer to the question 'How does God 
know contingent facts?' Aquinas rejects the propriety of the question if it is 
interpreted as a request for the pedigree of God's knowledge. Even so, another 
aspect of the question lingers; namely, in what way does God know contingent 
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facts? What is God's knowledge of contingent fact like? Is there any province 
on the map of human experience which is close to God's knowledge of contingent 
fact? Second, it might be that God's knowledge is the cause of things, under 
some suitable interpretation of that slogan, but could it nevertheless happen that 
he does not know that his knowledge is the cause? His knowing that P would 
seem to be distinct from his knowing that his knowledge of P is the cause of P, 
yet qua omniscient, he must possess both items of knowledge. How does he 
possess the second-order item? 
There is more to Aquinas' strategy than the opening gambit, but the gambit 
itself merits further examination. 'God's knowledge is the cause of things' has 
two interpretations; depending on whether we take 'thing' (res) to mean entity 
or situation: 
(A) For any contingent entity, x, God's knowledge of x is the cause of 
x's existence. 
(B) For any contingent situation, S, God's knowledge of S is the cause 
of S's being the case. 
Aquinas certainly has (A) in mind, but it is hard to see how he can resist (B), 
for God is supposed to know not only what exists, but also whatever is true of 
what exists, and there is no indication in Aquinas' writings that he sees these 
as issues requiring separate treatment. 
Moreover, I believe that Aquinas subsumes (B) under (A). That is, what I 
have been calling a situation is regarded by Aquinas as a kind of res. Aquinas 
accepts the thesis that verum and ens are convertible terms (ST, la, q. 16, a. 3), 
which surely licenses him in thinking that for a proposition to be true is just for 
the world to be in a certain way, the way the proposition indicates. But a 
proposition is not a "sentence radical" or a function from possible worlds to 
truth values or any similar sort of abstract object. Against the antiqui Nominales, 
who held that 'Christ is being born,' 'Christ will be born,' and 'Christ has been 
born' express the same proposition since they refer to the same thing-namely, 
the nativity of Christ-Aquinas, citing Aristotle as authority (Categories 5.4" 22 
ff.), holds a view about proposition which maintains that they can change their 
truth values through time (ST, la, q. 14, a. 15, ad 3). 'Socrates is sitting' is a 
proposition which is true whenever Socrates is sitting and false otherwise. ('Soc-
rates is sitting' is thus not necessarily elliptical for 'Socrates is sitting at t 1 .') 
Although Aquinas objects to the Nominales' saying that 'Socrates is sitting' and 
'Socrates was sitting' refer to the same thing, his objection in no way hinges on 
his denying that they refer to things. Now the things to which they most plausibly 
refer are situations".%o at ST, la, q. 16, a. 8, ad 4 Aquinas says that Socrates' 
sitting (sessio Socratis) is the cause of the truth of the proposition 'Socrates is 
sitting' (Socrates sedet); that is, the situation, the sitting of Socrates, is a thing 
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whose existence makes the proposition, 'Socrates is sitting,' true. 
The willingness to count contingent situations as things is encouraged by 
Aristotle's fourfold ontological inventory, introduced in the Categories (2.1a 20 
ff.), which includes things which are "in a subject but not said of any subject." 
The stock example of such a thing is the individual whiteness of some body, 
e.g., Socrates' body. The whiteness of Socrates is the unique, unrepeatable 
instance of the quality, whiteness, which inheres in Socrates. Notice that just as 
albedo Socratis is the most natural translation of 'the whiteness of Socrates,' so 
'sessio Socratis' is the most natural translation of 'the sitting of Socrates' or 
'Socrates' sitting.' Thus on the Aristotelian scheme of things, at least in cases 
where 'x is F' is a contingently true sentence, 'the F-ness of x' refers to a thing 
as much as 'x' does. '2 
In sum, the thesis that God's knowledge is the cause of things includes situations 
within the scope of 'things.' 
B. How Can Knowledge Be a Cause? In particular, in what way is God's 
knowledge the cause of things? A second thesis which can be extracted from 
ST, la, q. 14, a. 8 is that God's knowledge is the cause of things in the way in 
which a craftsman's knowledge is the cause of his handiwork. The kind of 
knowledge by which the craftsman produces his handiwork is practical knowl-
edge, which Aquinas wishes to distinguish from speculative knowledge. The 
discussion in ST, la, q. 14, a. 16 suggests how the distinction is supposed to 
go. A person who has speculative knowledge has knowledge, to some degree, 
about what is, what can be, and what must be. In reporting on a person's 
speCUlative knowledge in a particular domain, we would typically list the most 
salient propositions comprising that person's knowledge. Aquinas thinks of 
speculative knowledge as forming, ideally, an explanatory hierarchy: the goal 
of speculative knowledge is the unification and explanation of our experience. 
Practical knowledge, on the other hand, is knowledge of how to do and bring 
about. A list of a person's practical knowledge would not be a list of propositions; 
it would be a repertoire. The items in a person's repertoire will usually be talents 
and skills, not mere abilities. The former come about in the ordinary course of 
events by training and habituation; the latter need not. (In virtue solely of being 
anatomically normal, a person has the ability to kick a soccer ball. He may 
nevertheless not be especially skilled at kicking soccer balls.) 
Of course the two kinds of knowledge are interwoven. An expert in dendrology 
has speculative knowledge about what constitutes an elm tree and what constitutes 
a beech tree. But in virtue of possessing the speculative knowledge, the expert 
can sort out elms from beeches. Although interwoven, speCUlative and practical 
knowledge can be separated. A child may know how to ride a bicycle without 
having any speculative knowledge of rotational kinematics. Chicken sexers are 
notoriously unable to explain how they are successful; the twist in this case is 
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that no one else is able to account for their success either. And, to go in the 
other direction, having read a how-to-do it manual, I might have some low-level 
speculative knowledge about brazing copper tubing, yet not know how to braze 
copper tubing. (The difference between the passive and the infinitive is revealing. 
I can know how copper tubing is brazed without knowing how to braze copper 
tubing.) In light of these facts it seems unlikely that either kind of knowledge 
can be reduced or assimilated to the other. 
The craftsman produces his handiwork in virtue of exercising a skill or set of 
skills which he possesses. But it is not the mere possession of the skills which 
results in the production. There must in addition be an act of will: it is the builder 
abuilding who builds, not the builder dormant. "The same science covers oppo-
sites," and because of that fact, mere possession of the skills does not issue in 
production. The slogan, as it applies to practical knowledge, has two interpreta-
tions: 
(C) If x knows how to <l> (bring about S), then in virtue of that knowledge, 
x has the ability to <l> (bring about S) and x has the ability to forbear 
from <l>ing (bringing about S). 
(D) If x knows how to <l> (bring aboutS), then in virtue of that knowledge, 
x has the ability to bring about beneficial states of affairs related to the 
activity of <l>ing (bringing about S) and x has the ability to bring about 
harmful states of affairs related to the activity of <l>ing (bringing about S). 
It might be said that a magnet has the ability to move iron filings, but even so, 
the magnet does not have the ability not to move iron filings. So, according to 
(C), the magnet does not know how to move iron filings. There is no "science" 
in the magnet since its behavior cannot "cover opposites" or be other than what 
it is. 
Whereas (C) rules out the ascription of practical knowledge to beings which 
are incapable of behaving voluntarily, (D) is designed to capture the sentiment 
displayed in the adage that who knows best how to cure knows best how to kill. 
The opposites "covered" by the science of medicine are beneficial and harmful 
states of affairs of the sort having to do with health, which, to the extent to 
which they can be voluntarily induced at all, require the exercise of the practical 
knowledge of medicine. Other examples illustrating (D) are easy to come by. 
The lawyer, the CPA, and the computer programmer are all familiar cases of 
people whose practical knowledge gives them the potential for doing sophisticated 
sorts of good and evil. 
The ascription of practical knowledge to God is not just like its ascription to 
humans, although the differences are not the source of any mystery. 
(1) Any human's repertoire, no matter how impressive, is limited, both with 
respect to other humans and with respect to God. John McEnroe is no concert 
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pianist; Vladimir Ashkenazy is no tennis professional. Moreover, even the most 
impressive of human repertoires pales in comparison to God's. The message 
from the great speeches in the Book of Job is not merely "anything you can do, 
I can do better." It is also "I can do things no human could ever do." In fact, 
the natural view is to regard God as possessing all practical knowledge, and to 
take this as an entailment of his omniscience and omnipotence. 
(2) God must have all practical knowledge without having acquired any of it. 
He does not learn his skills by practice, training, or habituation; for there could 
not have been a time at which he lacks them. Nor could there be a time at which 
he loses one of his skills. These claims are straightforward entailments of the 
doctrine that God is essentially perfect. To lose or to gain a skill implies the 
existence of a time at which one does not have the skill, and at that time, at 
least, one is not perfect. 
(3) With humans it sometimes happens that skill and will are not sufficient 
for success; circumstances must cooperate to provide the opportunity. Julia Child 
may know how to prepare sole Florentine, and she may want to prepare sole 
Florentine, but without spinach her cause is lost. With God, we are told, things 
are otherwise. His will is unimpedable, a consequence of his sovereignty over 
all things. 
(4) Principle (D) implies that God has the ability to do all manner of harmful 
things, and although not all harmful things are evil, some are, and so principle 
(D) seems to imply that God can do evil if he has all practical knowledge. Like 
thesis (B), then, (D) raises a problem about the connection between God and 
evil. There are three basic approaches one can take to this issue. (a) Say that 
God can do evil, in just the same sense that humans can do evil. Perhaps he 
never does evil, or has need of doing evil, but he can nevertheless, and so (D) 
is not at all troublesome. (b) Say that he simply cannot do evil, even though he 
is omnipotent, and if (D) implies that he can, then there is something wrong 
with (D). This theme has two major variations. (b ' ) No matter what God did, 
it would be good; his very doing it would make it good. (b*) The "ability" to 
do evil is no genuine ability at all, but rather a liability or deficiency. Surface 
grammar misleads us: 'God can do evil' is better assimilated to 'Jones can die' 
than to 'Jones can play the Waldstein Sonata.' (c) Say that he can and cannot 
do evil, and hence that there must be at least two senses to the sentence 'God 
can do evil,' one sense which renders (D) true, and another sense which pays 
respects to the doctrine of God's impeccabilityY The solution to this problem 
is left as an exercise for the reader. 
C. Whither Human Freedom? Scientia Dei est causa rerum. The insertion of 
the definite article in the translation of this sentence (God's knowledge is the 
cause of things) is well-nigh irresistible but potentially misleading. The Latin 
allows an indefinite-article translation: 'God's knowledge is a cause of things.' 
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The use of the definite article suggests that God's knowledge is the only cause 
of things, which would preclude the causal efficacy of other agents. Calvin 
Norrnore spots a dilemma here: 
Either God's creative activity is a sufficient condition for my choosing 
to sin, in which case he can foreknow it but it is not clear that my 
choice is both free and efficacious, or God's creative activity is a neces-
sary but not a sufficient condition, in which case it is not easy to see 
how knowledge of it alone constitutes foreknowledge. 14 
(Norrnore's dilemma can be modified to exclude reference to foreknowledge.) 
Norrnore suggests that Aquinas grasps the first hom. I agree. I believe that 
Aquinas' position is that God's knowledge of Jones' free, contingent action is 
causally sufficient for its occurring, and that God's knowledge of it and Jones' 
choosing or willing it are individually necessary for its being free. 
One locus for Aquinas' views is ST, la, q. 83, a. 1. I believe that Aquinas' 
position is this: if x is a person and A is an action, then x is free to do A if and 
only if (I) x can choose to do A and x can choose not to do A, and (2) x chooses 
to do A or not to do A as a result of rational judgment. But my having the choice 
to do A in my power is not causally sufficient for my doing A (or omitting to 
do A): God's cooperation is necessary (ad 2 and 4). I do A freely only if my 
choosing to do A is in my power, but my choosing to do A is not causally 
sufficient for my doing A, and God's activity is causally necessary for my doing A . 
Aquinas says that "free choice is the [a?] cause of its own movement, since 
man moves himself to act through free choice"; yet that God, " ... by moving 
voluntary causes, does not prevent their [ensuing] actions from being voluntary, 
but rather he brings about this thing in them; for he operates in each thing 
according to its nature" (ST, la, q. 83, a. 1, ad 3). The first passage, I submit, 
amounts to saying that my freely choosing to do A is a cause of those subsequent 
actions which achieve the doing of A. In any event, the first passage is supposed 
to be compatible with the second one. God's activity moves, i.e., is the efficient 
cause of, my freely choosing to do A, yet my freely choosing to do A is something 
that is in my power. How can this be so? 
By distinguishing logically necessary and sufficient conditions from causally 
necessary and sufficient conditions, we can sort out four theses: 
(1) God's knowing is logically necessary: If I freely choose to do A, 
then God knows that I freely choose to do A. 
(2) God's knowing is logically sufficient: If God knows that I freely 
choose to do A, then I freely choose to do A. 
(3) God's knowing is causally necessary: My freely choosing to do A 
would not occur if God's knowing it did not occur. 
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(4) God's knowing is causally sufficient: God's knowing that I freely 
choose to do A is all that is needed to bring about my freely choosing 
to do A. 
We may take (2) to be true in virtue of the analysis of the concept of knowledge. 
Suitably generalized, (I) is one way of stating the thesis that God is omniscient, 
and it is precisely that thesis which we are trying to understand. I think that 
Aquinas is committed to both theses (3) and (4): they are entailments, respectively, 
of God's sovereignty and independence. So God's knowing that I freely choose 
to do A is a causally necessary and sufficient condition for my freely choosing 
to do A. My freely choosing to do A implies that I have it in my power to choose 
not to do A. So God's knowing that I freely choose to do A implies that I have 
it in my power to choose not to do A; if I did not have it in my power, God 
could not know that Ifreely choose to do A. If I have it in my power to choose 
not to do A, then God has it in his power to actualize a possible world in which 
I choose not to do A; in fact, my having the power that I have depends on God's 
having the power he has. If I actually choose to do A, my power to choose not 
to do A is a power I do not exercise, but it is a power I genuinely possess, even 
though it depends on a power which God possesses. God invests in me a certain 
power (to choose not to do A) while at the same time bringing it about that 
another power that I have (to choose to do A) is exercised. Note that if I actually 
choose to do A and do A, I am the author of the action as much as God is: 
'God's knowing that I freely bring it about that A brings it about that I freely 
bring it about that A' entails that I freely bring it about that A. 
Explication is not defense. There are philosophers who will find the account 
given above unacceptable even if they think it faithful to Aquinas. I cannot hope 
to pursue the issues further here, but hope to do so elsewhere. 
III. How God Knows 
In light of the discussion so far, we can make theses (A) and (B) somewhat 
more precise: 
(A') For any contingent thing, x, God's practical knowledge about how 
to produce x and his unimpedable will to produce x are the cause of x' s 
existence. 
(B') For any contingent situation, S, God's practical knowledge about 
how to bring about S and his unimpedable will to bring about S are the 
cause of S's being the case. 
God's knowledge of the contingent world, then, on the view we have been 
canvassing, is like a craftsman's knowledge of his products. Yet (A') and (B') 
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are inadequate. They could be true and it could still be false that God knows 
anything about the contingent world. Consider the following analogy. A potter 
knows how to make a certain kind of pot. The requisite materials and tools are 
at hand. The potter in fact wills to make the pot. Straightway she makes the 
pot. Does she now know that she has made the pot before her? No, for while 
she was cleaning her hands, a rival potter, who cunningly fashioned a pot 
indistinguishable from hers, placed it next to hers, shuffled the two pots for a 
while, and then removed one. It happens that the pot he removed was his own, 
so that the pot before our potter really is the one she made. Under these cir-
cumstances, she doe not know that the pot before her is hers, even though she 
made it, she believes that it is hers, and her belief is justified. Our potter's claim 
to knowledge is defeated by circumstances, knowledge of which she does not 
possess. 
This case is another illustration of the by-now-familiar fact that justified true 
belief is not the same as knowledge. Practical knowledge is no more immune 
from the sort of difficulty just sketched than speculative knowledge is. Anthony 
Kenny has recently tried to make out a case for exempting practical knowledge: 
... [I]f someone does know what he is doing--e.g. if he means to press 
button A and is pressing button A-then he knows that he is pressing 
button A without observation; he needs no further grounds, reason, 
evidence, etc. in order to make his meaning to press button A constitute 
knowledge that he is pressing button A. For speculative knowledge, in 
general, at least three things need to be the case for it to be true that 
X knows that p: first, that X believes that p, second, that p be true, 
and third, that X has grounds, i.e. good reason, for believing that p. 
In the case of practical knowledge only the first two are necessary. 15 
Imagine the following. Two perfectly similar buttons, A and B, are before 
Kenny's button-pusher, but the room is completely dark. He means to press 
button A, he stabs his finger out into the darkness and, as luck has it, he presses 
button A. By Kenny's lights he knows "without observation" that he is pressing 
button A. But that is absurd. I suspect that Kenny had in mind some background 
observational component when he (under-) described the case-namely, that the 
button-pusher could see button A. That component, however, when made explicit, 
is enough to allow us to construct all sorts of counterexamples. Perhaps there 
is some interpretation of "practical knowledge" which requires only belief and 
truth. But under that interpretation, practical knowledge is no more knowledge 
than a rubber duck is a duck. 
In defense of (A') and (B'), some theist might wish to point out that they do 
not make claims about people in general, but rather God in particular. It might 
be alleged that (A') and (B') are necessarily true because of the uniqueness of 
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God's epistemic situation. God is omniscient, and hence no bizarre circumstances 
can defeat his knowledge, for he knows all details of all circumstances. 
Such a maneuver has lost sight of the problem with which be began. We had 
recourse to the notion of practical knowledge in an effort to understand how 
God could be omniscient with respect to matters of contingent fact. Now my 
hypothetical theist offers to make intelligible the adequacy of God's practical 
knowledge by appealing to his omniscience. The circle involved here may not 
be vicious, but one can reasonably protest that the curvature is too tight for 
intellectual comfort. 
The virtue of (A') and (B') is that they attempt to show how God can have 
knowledge of contingent fact without his knowledge being caused. The vice of 
(A') and (B') is that they are powerless to explain why God's knowing how and 
willing that entail his knowing that. I suggest that the way to overcome that 
deficiency is to supplement (A') and (B') with 
and 
(E) For any contingent thing, x, God's knowing that x exists is God's 
knowing that he wills that x exists, 
(F) For any contingent situation, S, God's knowing that S is the case 
is God's knowing that he wills that S is the case. 
(E) and (F) do not claim that God deduces his knowledge about Jones' BLT 
from his will. They claim, rather, that his knowledge about Jones' BLT just is 
his knowledge about his will with regard to Jones' BLT. What might seem to 
be two items of knowledge are one, according to (E) and/or (F). God's knowledge 
of contingent fact, then, is a kind of self-knowledge. He knows that Jones is 
eating a BLT because he wills that Jones is eating a BLT. As we have seen 
earlier, it cannot be that he infers his knowledge of his will from his will or 
from anything else. So his knowledge of contingent fact must be knowledge 
about his own willing activity and it must be noninferential. 
Could there be such knowledge? I see no reason to think not. I believe it will 
be instructive to juxtapose our abstruse theological speculation with a contempo-
rary discussion about the possibility and scope of contingent a priori knowledge. 16 
No one presently knows who wrote the Ars Meliduna. I stipulatively introduce 
the name 'Fulbert of Melun' as a rigid designator-as a term which designates 
the same individual in every possible world in which that individual exists-whose 
reference is fixed by the descriptive phrase 'the author of the Ars Meliduna.' 
'Fulbert of Melun' is not an abbreviation for 'the author of the Ars Meliduna': 
there are possible worlds in which Fulbert exists but is not the author of the Ars 
Meliduna. Because of this latter fact the sentence, 'Fulbert of Melun is the author 
of the Ars Meliduna,' is contingently true if true at all. Now the phrase, 'the 
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author of the Ars Meliduna,' could fail to refer even if the Ars Meliduna was 
authored: it might be, for example, that it was composed by a band of disgruntled 
Parvipontanians. In order to simplify the discussion, I propose to suppress that 
complication. Since I have stipulated that Fulbert is the author, I know a priori 
that Fulbert is the author. Even if it is subsequently discovered that the Ars 
Meliduna was written by Gerbert of Melun, my knowledge is secure, for all that 
the discovery shows is that Fulbert is Gerbert. Thus it seems that I have (1) a 
priori, (2) noninferential knowledge17 (3) of a contingent fact, and that in an 
obvious sense, (4) the item of knowledge is not caused by the fact but (5) is 
generated by my stipulative activity. Finally, a case can be made that (6) my 
knowing that Fulbert is the author of the Ars Meliduna just is my knowing that 
I stipulated it so. Now if some of my knowledge of contingent matters can have 
these features, why cannot all of God's? 
There are at least four impediments to this maneuver. 
The first impediment. "The kind of knowledge you can generate by your 
stipulations is de dicto, not de reo What you know from the example described 
above is that the sentence, 'Fulbert is the author of the Ars Meliduna,' is true. 
You do not know, from that fact alone, that Fulbert is the author of the Ars 
Meliduna. Suppose that, as luck has it, somebody named 'Fulbert' actually did 
compose theArs Meliduna, and that this fact was well-known by late-twelfth-cen-
tury Parisian logicians. It would be facetious of you to claim that you know 
what they know. Their knowledge was causally connected in some right way(s) 
to Fulbert; by hypothesis, all causal avenues to knowledge about Fulbert's author-
ship are presently closed to you. Hence your vaunted knowledge about Fulbert 
is more like knowledge about 'Fulbert.' Your stipulative activities, no matter 
how fervently sincere, gain you no access to the real world of twelfth-century 
logicians. 
"If that is what God's knowledge of contingent matters amounts to, then his 
epistemic predicament is unenviable. He is like the author of a very detailed 
book-a maximally consistent book-who does not know whether his book is 
fact or fiction. In terms of Leibniz' arresting metaphor, if God surveys all possible 
worlds, and if the actual world is just one among these infinitely many possible 
worlds, then how, on the account given above, encapsulated in points (1)-(6), 
does God know which world is the actual world?" 
Points (1)-(6), if they characterize any of my knowledge, characterize only a 
quirky part of it. As we have seen, in the ordinary case my practical knowledge 
and my will are not sufficient to guarantee that I know what I have done or that 
my production went as I intended it. No matter how much practice I have had, 
I can flub, and circumstances can be recalcitrant in ways I had not anticipated. 
In contrast, God's practical knowledge is perfect and his will is unimpedable. 
His knowledge de rebus is like my knowledge of my stipulations with respect 
450 Faith and Philosophy 
to points (1)-(6) above, but the difference between us is that his knowledge really 
is de rebus; to the extent to which I have knowledge satisfying conditions (1)-(6), 
mine is not. My stipulations create fact de dicto; God's will creates facts de reo 
As for the question posed at the end of the previous paragraph, God knows 
which world is the actual world by knowing his will. That is, he wills only one 
world to be the actual world-not even he could will more than onels-and he 
knows which world is the actual world by knowing what he WillS. 19 
The second impediment. "According to (E) and (F), God's knowledge about 
Jones' BLT is his knowledge of what he wills concerning Jones' BL T, but there 
is a gap between knowledge of will and knowledge of fact. Consider this inference: 
x knows that he wills that P. 
Thus: 
x knows that P. 
It is obvious that the first sentence can be true while the second is false. There 
is no entailment between the two, let alone identity. Claims like (E) and (F), 
then, are without defense. You have tried to paper over this gap by talking of 
God's perfect practical knowledge and his unimpedable will. These features need 
to be made explicit, and when they are, we have something like this (where 'P' 
takes as values true contingent propositions): 
(1) God knows that he wills that P. 
(2) God knows that he knows how to bring it about that P. 
(3) God knows that his will with respect to P is unimpedable. 
Thus: 
(4) God knows that P. 
Once all this is made explicit, however, it looks as though God's knowledge of 
contingent fact really is inferential, contrary to your earlier stricture." 
I see no reason to think that God must get to (4) by way of (1), (2), and (3). 
The issue is not whether (2) and (3) are true-they are entailments of any 
reasonable analysis of divine omniscience-but rather whether God needs them 
to have knowledge that P. consider an earthly analogy. Suppose that Margaret 
sees that the dog is in the yard. Then Margaret's seeing that the dog is in the 
yard just is her knowing that the dog is in the yard. She need not infer her 
knowledge, consciously or subconsciously, from anything else. It may be that 
what leads us to believe that her seeing is her knowing is that we know that her 
visual apparatus is in sound working order and that in the present circumstances, 
her visual environment is normal. But Margaret need not know all that in order 
for her seeing to be her knowing. In similar fashion, that God knows how to 
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bring it about that P and that his will is unirnpedable may make it clear to us 
why God's knowledge of his will is his knowledge of fact-that is, why (1) and 
(4) jointly express an identity-but God himself does not have to rehearse (2) 
and (3) in order to know that P: all he needs to know is that he wills that P. 
Thus we are not forced to agree that (1 )-(4) express a divine inference pattern. 
The third impediment. "People can forget what they once knew, even what 
they once know a priori. You may stipulate that Fulbert is the author of the Ars 
Meliduna, then forget that fact, and come to believe later that you attributed the 
authorship to whomever wrote the Tractatus Anagnini. God may at such-and-such 
a time will that Jones eats a BLT, know at that time that Jones is eating a BLT, 
forget it fifteen minutes later, and come to believe that Jones was eating escargot. 
That kind of liability cannot befall an essentially omniscient being. But there is 
nothing in the account that you have given which addresses the issue of God's 
memory and the possibility of false beliefs. At best, your account is incomplete." 
The fourth impediment. "The proposal is to base God's knowledge of contingent 
fact on his knowledge of himself. Why is self-knowledge any less problematic 
than factual knowledge? 'Know thyself' is no trivial piece of advice. We do not 
have Cartesian access to our own thoughts, and the variety of unconscious 
motivation, revision, and self-deception which people are capable of is wondrous 
to behold. The proposal, to be successful, must presuppose that God's will is 
perfectly transparent to himself. Why should we think that that is so?" 
Both these objections allege, in effect, that I have traded in one sort of difficulty 
for another. I propose to respond to the objections by invoking a doctrine, to be 
found in Aquinas, which many have thought to be indefensible. As I move from 
frying pan to fire I shall be accompanied by the doctrine of divine simplicity, a 
doctrine which. maintains that God, qua perfect being, has no physical parts or 
metaphysical constituents. Everything that God is just is God, according to the 
doctrine. I have defended the intelligibility of the doctrine elsewhere and cannot 
hope to redeploy those defenses here. 20 What I shall do is show how the doctrine 
handles the third and fourth impediments. 
If God is simple, then there are no temporal stages to his existence; a being 
with a temporal career is by that very fact complex. If God is simple and perfect, 
he is eternal in the Boethian sense of eternity: he enjoys "the complete possession 
all at once of illimitable life. "21 As a consequence, what God knows he knows 
all at once. There are no successive stages to his mental life, and if that is so, 
then many kinds of human mental phenomena (logically) cannot characterize 
him. He cannot grow angry, fall in love, discover new theorems in number 
theory, or learn the capital of the state of North Dakota. Nor can he forget, nor 
remember. The third impediment is a plausible objection only if one assumes 
that God's experience is characterized by temporally successive stages. On the 
theory that God is simple, and hence eternal, that assumption is a gratuitions 
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piece of anthropomorphism. (It is now obvious why a defender of God's eternality 
has no problem with God'sjoreknowledge of human free choices.) 
Consideration of the fourth impediment evokes the most distinctive feature of 
the doctrine of divine simplicity. According to the doctrine, there is no distinction 
in God between his substance and his attributes. 'God is wise' and 'God is 
powerful' are more perspicuously expressed as 'Necessarily, God = the wisdom 
of God' and 'Necessarily, God = the power of God.' Thus, 'God,' 'the wisdom 
of God,' and 'the power of God' necessarily refer to the same thing if they refer 
at all. Pertinent to our present concern, Aquinas says that God's being is his 
understanding (ST, la, q. 14, a. 5), and the context (see ST, la, q. 14, a. 2-4) 
makes it clear that he means that God's being is his understand of himself. Thus 
the doctrine of divine simplicity entails that God's knowledge of himself is 
himself. The doctrine also entails that God's knowing is his willing (ST, la, q. 
19, a. 1). With these entailments under our belts we can ring the following 
changes on thesis (F). For any contingent situation, S, God's knowing that Sis 
the case = God's knowing that he wills that S is the case = God's willing that 
S is the case = God's knowing himself = God. And if S' is a situation distinct 
from S, then God's knowing that S is the case = God's knowing that S' is the 
case. 22 
According to the doctrine of divine simplicity, then, God is identical with his 
knowing and willing activity (and his knowing activity is identical with his 
willing activity), whereas I am not identical with my knowing or my willing. I 
can fail to have complete knowledge of myself just because my acts of knowing 
and willing are multifarious, distinct from themselves and from me. I see that 
the dog is in the yard, hear the rain falling outside, infer that the dog will get 
wet if I do not let him in, and decide to let him in. Pace Descartes, I may not 
be aware of all of this. The inference may be subconscious; in seeing that the 
dog is in the yard I may not realize that I am seeing that he is in the back half 
of the yard. However, if God is perfectly simple, then he is not subject to a 
plurality of acts of knowing and willing. His knowing that the dog is in the yard 
is his willing that the dog is in the yard, which is his willing that the Egyptians 
suffer a plague of locusts, which is his knowing that the Egyptians suffer a 
plague of locusts. One and the same divine activity is all these things and more. 
Moreover, this divine activity is not a part or an emanation or a property of 
God; it is God. His perfect awareness of himself is what it is to be God. The 
fourth impediment makes sense only if we think that God's mental life is com-
posed of aspects, episodes, or parts which are distinct from each other and from 
God. No skeptical wedge about self-knowledge can be driven where there are 
no parts to be divided. 23 
I believe, then, that the account given in theses (A)-(F), supplemented by the 
doctrine of divine simplicity, provides a coherent account of how God, a sup-
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remely perfect being, can have knowledge of contingent fact. The account meets 
the requirement insisted upon by traditional theists and entailed by God's being 
perfect, namely, that God's knowledge depend on nothing other than himself. 
The account is embedded in an ambitious web of philosophical and theological 
doctrines, some of which are not beyond controversy. How could it be otherwise? 
My only hope is that the tensile strength of the web is increased by its ability 
to absorb and dissipate the problem we have been examining. 24 
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APPENDIX 
Summa theologiae, la, q. 14, a. 5: 
.. .It is necessary that God know things other than himself. For it is manifest 
that he understands himself perfectly: otherwise his being would not be perfect, 
since his being is his understanding. But if something is known perfectly, it is 
necessary that its power be know perfectly. But the power of some being cannot 
be known perfectly unless those things to which the power extends are known. 
Thus, since the divine power extends to other things-from the very fact that it 
is the first effective cause of all things, as is clear from what was said above 
(la, q. 2, a. 3)--it is necessary that God know things other than himself. And 
this becomes even more evident if it is added that the very being of the first 
efficient cause-namely God-is his understanding. 
Summa theologiae, la, q. 14, a. 8: 
... God's knowledge is the cause of things. For God's knowledge stands to all 
created things as the knowledge of a craftsman [artifex] stands to [his] artifacts. 
But the knowledge of the craftsman is the cause of artifacts just because the 
craftsman works through his intellect. Hence it must be that the form in the 
intellect is the working principle, as heat is the principle of heating. But one 
should remember that a natural form, insofar as it is a form remaining in that 
to which it gives being, does not denote a principle of action unless it has an 
inclination to an effect. Similarly, an intelligible form does not denote a principle 
of action according as it is merely in the one who understand, but only if there 
is adjoined to it an inclination to an effect which is through the will. For since 
an intelligible form covers opposites (since the same science covers opposites), 
it would not produce a determinate effect unless it were determined to one thing 
by desire, as it is said in Metaphysics, IX. But it is obvious that God causes 
things by his understanding, since his being is his understanding. Hence it is 
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necessary that his knowledge is the cause of things, when conjoined with [his] 
will .... 
.. . Natural things are midway between God's knowledge and our knowledge. For 
we acquire knowledge from natural things, of which God, through his knowledge, 
is the cause. Hence, just as the knowable natural things are prior to our knowledge, 
and the measure of it, so God's knowledge is prior to the natural things, and 
the measure of them; just as a particular house is midway between the knowledge 
of the craftsman who builds it and the knowledge of him who acquires knowledge 
of it from the house already built. 
Summa theologiae, la, q. 14, a. 16: 
... Some knowledge is purely speculative, some is purely practical, and some is 
somewhat speculative and somewhat practical. As evidence of this one should 
realize that knowledge can be called speculative in three ways. First, on account 
of things known which are not manipulable [operabilis] by the knower, such as 
human knowledge of natural of divine things. Second, on account of the mode 
of knowing; for example, if a builder were to consider a house by defining, 
dividing, and considering its universal properties: this surely is to consider man-
ipulable things in a speculative way, and not insofar as they are manipulable 
things. For a thing is manipulable by the application of form to matter, not by 
the resolution of the complex into its universal formal principles. Third, on 
account of the end, for "the practical intellect differs from the speculative intellect 
by its end," as it is said in De anima, III. For the practical intellect is set in 
order to the end sought in its manipulation, but the end of the speculative intellect 
is the consideration of truth. Hence if some builder were to consider how some 
house could be made, not setting in order his manipulation to the end [of making 
it] but only to the end of knowing, that would be, in regard to the end, a 
speculative consideration, although of a manipulable thing. Therefore, knowledge 
which is speculative on account of the thing known itself is purely speculative. 
However, knowledge which is speculative either on account of the mode or on 
account of the end is somewhat speculative and somewhat practical. However, 
when it is set in order to the end sought in its manipulation it is purely practical. 
Thus according to this one should say that God has purely speculative knowl-
edge of himself, for he himself is not manipulable. However, of all other things 
he has knowledge both speculative and practical. 
University of Vermont 
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